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 1 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1 Modern litigation between spouses regarding their children is often 
international. Such cross-border disputes are especially common in 
Singapore, as an international commercial centre with a diverse and 
cosmopolitan society. More importantly, Singaporeans are becoming an 
increasingly mobile labour force, working in international businesses. 
Orders made by Singapore courts involving local parties and local children 
will increasingly require recognition and enforcement overseas. 
A. CHALLENGES ARISING IN SINGAPORE’S CURRENT PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
2 Cross-border family disputes raise multiple challenges under 
Singapore’s current private international law framework: 
(a) Costly and complex disputes over which country’s courts should 
hear the case, and which country’s laws should apply. Each parent may 
bring court proceedings in different countries. This leads to litigation 
in multiple jurisdictions over which court should hear the case, 
which may result in conflicting decisions between courts, confusion, 
lengthy litigation and intensified animosity between parents. 
Singapore’s current ad hoc approach to the regulation of 
international disputes does not have any impact on how foreign 
concerned States will deal with the case at hand. 
(b) Enforceability of orders in foreign countries. There no 
mechanism for the recognition or enforcement of Singapore orders 
pertaining to child matters abroad. Orders made by the court of the 
child’s habitual residence may not be recognised or enforced by the 
country to which the child has been relocated, and this may result in 
the relocating parent ignoring the court orders in their entirety. 
(c) Information asymmetry post-relocation. Once a child is 
relocated overseas, it may be difficult for the left-behind parent to 
obtain information about the child’s welfare or whereabouts if the 
relocating parent becomes uncooperative, takes deliberate steps to 
conceal the whereabouts of the child, or withholds information 
relating to the child. 
(d) Lack of assistance across jurisdictions. In cases involving 
multiple countries, the authorities in the affected countries may need 
to cooperate in order to ensure the issues are resolved effectively. 
The existing institutional mechanisms for administrative or judicial 
cooperation across national borders are basic. 
3 Issues arising from international family disputes cannot be addressed 
by simple adjustments to domestic law: these legal problems which involve 
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2 
an international element can only be resolved by reciprocal arrangements 
between States, or harmonisation of laws both locally and abroad. 
B. HOW THE 1996 CONVENTION WILL CHANGE SINGAPORE’S 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
4 The Hague Convention 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (“the 1996 
Convention”) seeks to resolve the challenges highlighted by addressing the 
law in four areas: jurisdiction, choice of law, recognition and enforcement, 
and cooperation between Contracting States. 
(a) Jurisdiction. Under the 1996 Convention, the State of the child’s 
habitual residence (if it is a Contracting State), will ordinarily have 
pre-eminent jurisdiction to deal with cases relating to the child’s 
welfare. There are also other bases for jurisdiction for urgent 
measures or where another State may be better placed to deal with 
the child for defined reasons. 
(b) Choice of law. A State applies its own domestic law when it 
exercises jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention. However, if the 
State has to address a specific issue relating to the determination or 
termination of the scope of parental responsibility, it will apply the 
law of the child’s habitual residence. 
(c) Recognition and enforcement of orders. Orders made by a State 
exercising jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention will be 
automatically recognised or enforceable in other Contracting States. 
Recognition and enforcement may only be refused in limited 
circumstances. 
(d) Cooperation. The 1996 Convention provides means for 
Contracting States to work with each other to achieve its objectives. 
Requests for cooperation and information in respect of children in 
Contracting States will be channelled through the Central Authority 
appointed in each Contracting State. However, most of these 
obligations are voluntary and not compulsory. The 1996 Convention 
establishes a formal framework for such cooperation. 
5 The 1996 Convention has at present 45 Contracting States. This 
includes the Member States of the European Union, almost all of which also 
apply Brussels IIA, an EU Regulation concerning conflict of laws in family 
matters that overlaps with the 1996 Convention. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
6 The Committee recommends considering accession to the 1996 
Hague Convention, which will be advantageous to Singapore for the 
following reasons: 
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(a) The 1996 Convention, by aligning bases of jurisdiction in all 
Contracting States, increases clarity and certainty as to the pre-
eminent jurisdiction in a multi-jurisdictional dispute. This will 
obviate a race by parties to request multiple courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over the same child for technical advantages in litigation. 
(b) Once jurisdiction is met, there is automatic enforcement and 
recognition in all Contracting States. This will mean that Singapore 
orders will be recognised and enforced in all Contracting States, even 
though Singapore courts will then have to recognise the orders of 
other Contracting States. 
(c) The 1996 Convention furthers the best interests of the 
children, through its clear child centricity in its approach and range 
of reliefs. 
(d) The 1980 Child Abduction Convention, which has been 
enacted into law in Singapore, will be better supported and work 
better, through preservation of the notion of habitual residence for a 
time period, safe harbour orders to assist with return, and a wider 
range of measures available to the court if a child is not returned. 
(e) The 1996 Convention provides an exemplary institutional 
framework of Central Authorities which will enable cooperation and 
communication between Contracting States. 
(f) Adopting the 1996 Convention at an early stage prepares 
Singapore for the future. It will permit Singapore to build up the hard 
and soft processes to deal with international issues that may arise, 
while the caseload is less burdensome. Early adoption also allows 
Singapore to shape international 1996 Convention jurisprudence in a 
manner more beneficial to Singapore as an international norm, 
although it will then lose the second-hand lessons it may learn from 
others through later adoption. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW TO REPORT 
A. CHALLENGES IN CROSS-BORDER CHILD DISPUTES 
7 The modern family dispute is often international. Singapore, in 
particular, is an international commercial centre with a diverse and 
cosmopolitan society. The proportion of divorces in the local courts 
involving at least one party who is a foreigner increased from 31% in 2011 to 
40% in 2016.1 This statistic, which excludes custody and relocation cases 
filed outside of the divorce framework, is consistent with trends abroad.2 
More importantly, with more Singaporeans working in international 
businesses and becoming an increasingly mobile labour force, Singapore 
court orders involving local parties will also require reciprocal 
enforcement. At present, approximately 49% of the divorces filed in 2016 
involved at least one child below 21 years old.3 
8 Cross-border family disputes raise numerous challenges. They are 
often characterised by parallel proceedings in multiple fora. Each 
competing court may assume jurisdiction on its own terms, even if it may 
overlap with the jurisdiction of another. There are hurdles to recognising or 
enforcing a judgment made by the court of one country in the court of 
another. This encourages re-litigation and impedes finality. A party may 
flout a court order and forcibly remove a child to seek refuge in another 
jurisdiction which the party thinks is more favourable. This can be 
traumatic and have a negative long-term impact on the welfare and mental 
health of the affected child.4 
                                                   
1 Family Justice Courts’ internal statistics. During the same period the number of 
divorces involving a foreign spouse rose from 1,930 to 2,498. 
2 The number of cross-border family legal disputes in the UK courts has grown tenfold 
in a decade, rising from 65 cases in 2008 to 253 in 2012: Office of the Head of 
International Family Justice for England and Wales, Annual Report (2012), available at 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/international 
_family_justice_2013.pdf (accessed on 18 May 2017). 
3 Family Justice Courts’ internal statistics. Of the 6,9301 divorce cases filed, 3,096 of the 
cases involved at least one child below the age of 21. Those cases involved a total 
number of 4,834 children below the age of 21. 
4 See David A Alexander and Susan Klein, “Kidnapping and hostage-taking: a review of 
effects, coping and resilience”, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine (2009) 
102(1):16–21. 
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B. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE CROSS-BORDER 
CHALLENGES 
9 Child abduction concerns have been met by Singapore’s accession to 
the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(“the 1980 Convention”).5 The other challenges alluded to above are the 
object of the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children (“the 1996 Convention”),6 which 
aims to address holistically matters concerning jurisdiction, applicable law, 
and the recognition and enforcement of measures that protect the person 
and property of a child in cross-border situations.7 
10 This Report discusses the utility of the 1996 Convention in the 
Singapore context and the principal areas in which Singapore’s existing 
laws will be affected, were the 1996 Convention obligations to be adopted 
into domestic law. Issues relating to implementation are also briefly dealt 
with. 
                                                   
5 Incorporated into Singapore law through the International Child Abduction Act 
(Cap 143C, 2011 Rev Ed) which came into force on 1 March 2011. 
6 The 1996 Convention which came into force on 1 January 2002. As at 24 June 2016, 
there were 44 Contracting States to the 1996 Convention, comprising all the European 
Union States (UK inclusive), Australia, Russia and the United States. The Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, founded as a permanent organization in 
1955, has five “Children’s Conventions”, as they have come to be known, to provide 
“practical machinery to enable States which share a common interest in protecting 
children to cooperate together to do so”: HCCH, Outline of the Hague Convention of 
1996 on the International Protection of Children (September 2008) at p 1. Apart from 
the 1996 and 1980 Conventions, the other three, which are not the subject of this 
Report, are the 1961 Convention concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law 
Applicable in respect of the Protection of Minors, the 1993 Convention on Protection 
of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, and the 2007 
Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and other forms of Family 
Maintenance. Many of the matters covered by the 1996 Convention were the subject 
of the earlier Convention concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law 
Applicable in respect of the Protection of Minors (“the 1961 Convention”). The 1996 
Convention resolves many of the difficulties in the earlier Convention: Gloria Folger 
DeHart, “The Relationship Between the 1980 Child Abduction Convention and the 
1996 Protection Convention” (2000-2001) 33 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 83 at p 83. Thus, the 1996 Convention has rules designed 
to “avoid legal and administrative conflicts” and to provide a common platform for 
international cooperation in matters of child protection between different legal 
systems: HCCH, Outline of the Hague Convention of 1996 on the International Protection 
of Children (September 2008) at pp 2–3. 
7 HCCH, Outline of the Hague Convention of 1996 on the International Protection of 
Children (September 2008) at p 2. 
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C. OVERVIEW OF THE 1996 CONVENTION 
11 Subject matter. The 1996 Convention does not deal with substantive 
family law issues.8 It seeks instead to regulate the private international law 
issues that arise in relation to children and families. These matters are at 
present determined in accordance with Singapore’s general private 
international law framework, which has its sources in the common law as 
well as primary and secondary legislation such as the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act9 and the Rules of Court.10 
12 Scope. The 1996 Convention applies to all “measures directed to the 
protection of the person or property of the child”.11 No definition of 
“measures of protection” is provided.12 The (non-exhaustive) list of 
examples include measures relating to parental responsibility, custody, 
access, guardianship, determination of the child’s place of residence and 
dealings in the child’s property.13 
13 Exclusions. The 1996 Convention contains specific exclusions from its 
scope.14 The more prominent of this closed list of exclusions are matters 
pertaining to maintenance, the establishment or contesting of a parent-
child relationship, adoption and trusts or succession. 
14 Age of child. The 1996 Convention applies to children up to 18 years 
of age, and in implementation its scope will apply to children under 18 from 
other Contracting countries.15 
15 Organisation. The provisions in the 1996 Convention are organised in 
four parts: jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement, and 
cooperation. 
                                                   
8 There can, however, be an indirect impact on the substantive rules to the extent that 
the choice of law rules supplied by the 1996 Convention displace the overwhelming 
preference for the lex fori under the extant choice of law rules. 
9 Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed. 
10 Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed. 
11 Article 1(a), 1996 Convention. 
12 This was left deliberately undefined to account for the diversity of measures that 
were adopted in various legal systems: Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 
1997) at para 18. 
13 Article 3, 1996 Convention. 
14 Article 4, 1996 Convention. 
15 For example, the 1980 Convention ceases to apply when a child attains the age of 
16 years. The International Child Abduction Act (Cap 143C, 2011 Rev Ed) simply 
introduced a substantive domestic rule that mandates the return of a wrongfully 
removed child when the circumstances stipulated within the 1980 Convention are 
satisfied. 
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1. Jurisdiction 
16 The essence of the 1996 Convention is contained in its opening part 
on jurisdiction. It aims to eliminate, in principle, all competition between 
the authorities of different States in relation to measures of protection for 
children.16 This is achieved by centralising and consolidating jurisdiction to 
deal with measures of protection concerning a child within the State of the 
child’s habitual residence.17 In other words, under the 1996 Convention, the 
State of the child’s habitual residence possesses pre-eminent jurisdiction in 
relation to all measures of protection concerning that child. There are 
limited exceptions and instances where concurrent jurisdiction is 
permitted. 
2. Applicable law 
17 The 1996 Convention consolidates the choice of law rules in two 
main areas. First, when the authorities of a Contracting State exercise 
jurisdiction in accordance with the grounds articulated in the 
1996 Convention, the applicable law is ordinarily the lex fori of the 
Contracting State exercising such jurisdiction.18 Second, when the 
authorities of a Contracting State are concerned with the exercise, 
extinction or attribution of parental responsibility, the applicable law is 
ordinarily the law of the child’s habitual residence.19 The practical effect is 
that, with the chapters on jurisdiction and applicable law working in 
unison, the court with pre-eminent jurisdiction would be the court of the 
child’s habitual residence, and it would ordinarily apply the lex fori.20 The 
lex fori is also general choice of law rule adopted under Singapore’s present 
legal framework,21 and so the choice of law rules in the 1996 Convention are 
substantially similar to those currently applied in Singapore. Therefore, the 
                                                   
16 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 6. 
17 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 37. See Article 5(1), 
1996 Convention, which reads: 
The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual 
residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the 
protection of the child’s person or property. 
18 Article 15(1), 1996 Convention. 
19 Article 16(1), 1996 Convention. 
20 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 6. 
21 The welfare principle as part of the lex fori is applied regardless of the foreign 
elements in the case: see J and another v C and others [1970] AC 668 at 711. This was a 
decision under s 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo 5 c 45), which 
is the predecessor to s 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed). 
There is no reason to expect that of the provisions in Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 
2009 Rev Ed) will be interpreted otherwise. Under ss 122–132 of the Women’s 
Charter, the court is given a broad discretion in divorce proceedings to take 
measures that will promote of the welfare of the child. It seems to follow naturally 
from the court’s observations in TQ v TR [2009] 2 SLR(R) 961 at [42], [87] and [93] 
that these provisions concerning children will be given mandatory effect. 
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part of the 1996 Convention on applicable law is not given substantial 
treatment in this Report. 
3. Recognition and enforcement 
18 This part, which is premised on reciprocity, aims to reduce the 
incidence of re-litigation by ensuring that primacy is given to the decisions 
taken by the authorities of the Contracting State in which the child has his 
or her habitual residence. 22 The general principle is that a measure of 
protection taken in one Contracting State shall automatically be recognised 
by operation of law in all other Contracting States.23 If enforcement of that 
measure is sought in another Contracting State, the measure may be 
declared enforceable or registered for the purpose of enforcement,24 and, if 
necessary, enforced in that State as if it were a measure taken by the 
authorities of that State.25 There are exceptions justifying the non-recognition 
or non-enforcement of a measure of protection. These exceptions, which 
include lack of jurisdiction, violation of fundamental principles of procedure 
and the right to be heard, and offense to public policy, are set out 
exhaustively in the 1996 Convention.26 
4. Cooperation 
19 The provisions concerning cooperation in the 1996 Convention rest 
on the concept of a Central Authority, which has been successfully 
employed in other international conventions concerning children.27 As the 
“fixed point” of contact, each Central Authority’s general mission is to 
cooperate and promote cooperation,28 by providing information and 
facilitating communication between Contracting States,29 among other 
means. 
                                                   
22 The provisions in the part on recognition and enforcement are novel and were not 
present in the 1961 Convention: Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at 
para 6. 
23 Articles 23, 24 and 25, 1996 Convention. 
24 Articles 26 and 27, 1996 Convention. 
25 Article 28, 1996 Convention. 
26 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 121. 
27 The 1980 Convention is the leading example: Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report 
(15 January 1997) at para 136. 
28 Article 30, 1996 Convention. 
29 Article 31, 1996 Convention. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RATIONALISING THE BASIS FOR COOPERATION 
20 The 1996 Convention prescribes the specific bases upon which the 
authorities of a Contracting State can assume jurisdiction. Once a court has 
jurisdiction, its orders will have immediate and automatic effect in all other 
Contracting States. 
A. SINGAPORE’S CURRENT PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
FRAMEWORK 
21 Singapore’s legal framework on jurisdiction observes the distinction 
between the existence of jurisdiction, the absence of which is an absolute 
bar to a Singapore court hearing a case, and the exercise of jurisdiction. 
Even if the existence of the Singapore court’s jurisdiction is established, the 
Singapore court may nonetheless decline to exercise that jurisdiction, on 
the basis that there is another clearly more appropriate forum in which the 
matter ought to be heard. 
B. EXISTENCE OF JURISDICTION: BROAD COMMON LAW GROUNDS 
OF JURISDICTION 
22 The specific civil jurisdiction of the High Court to hear matters 
relating to the person or property of children is conferred on it by 
section 17(d) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. This jurisdiction may 
be exercised through either of two modes:30 
(a) First, as an adjunct to the court’s jurisdiction over divorce and 
matrimonial causes under the Women’s Charter.31 The court has 
jurisdiction over divorce and matrimonial causes, and with it, the 
power to make any order the court thinks fit with respect to the 
welfare of any child.32 This basis of jurisdiction is centred on the 
divorce and appears to subsist independent of the child’s 
connections (or lack thereof) to the forum.33 
(b) Second, from the provisions of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 
which allows the court to make provision for infants, or regulate and 
                                                   
30 Debbie Ong, International Issues in Family Law in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 
2015) at para 7.30. 
31 Section 17(a), Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed). 
32 Section 124, Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed). 
33 Debbie Ong, International Issues in Family Law in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 
2015) at para 7.35; Sim Hong Boon v Sim Lois Joan [1971–1973] SLR(R) 597 at [6]–[7]. 
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control the affairs of guardians and their relation to the infants.34 The 
Guardianship of Infants Act is silent as to the bases of jurisdiction on 
which these powers may be exercised.35 The precise boundaries of 
the common law bases of jurisdiction are unclear,36 but include the 
presence,37 nationality38 and ordinary residence39 of the child. 
1. Exercise of jurisdiction: the Spiliada test 
23 These apparently broad grounds of jurisdiction are constrained in 
practice by the Spiliada test,40 which the court applies to determine 
whether it should exercise its jurisdiction to hear a case containing foreign 
elements. The Spiliada test has been held applicable to matrimonial 
proceedings in general,41 and applications concerning children in 
particular.42 It is consistent with the welfare principle,43 because it is 
ordinarily in the child’s welfare for the proceedings concerning the child to 
be heard by the most appropriate forum, or the court best-placed to 
determine what the welfare of the child requires.44 
24 The Spiliada test is applied in two stages. 
(a) First, the identification of the most appropriate forum for the 
trial or hearing of the action. At this stage the onus is on the 
defendant to establish that there is a forum which is clearly more 
appropriate than Singapore. The court adopts a broad factorial 
approach and considers the nationality or domicile of the child,45 the 
jurisdiction in which the child is present,46 the habitual residence of 
the child,47 the previous habitual residence(s) of the child,48 whether 
                                                   
34 Section 3, Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed). 
35 See Tan Yock Lin, Conflicts Issues in Family and Succession Law (Butterworths, 1993) 
at pp 491–496, which states: “[t]he legislature was content to rely on the grounds of 
jurisdiction developed at common law”. 
36 See Law Reform Committee, Report on Ancillary Orders After Foreign Divorce or 
Annulment (July 2009) at paras 31–35. In TGT v TGU [2015] SGHCF 10, the court 
assumed jurisdiction despite the child who formed the subject of the application 
having no connection whatsoever to Singapore. The point on the existence of the 
court’s jurisdiction was, however, not argued or decided; submissions were only 
made on whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction. 
37 See Tan Yock Lin, Conflicts Issues in Family and Succession Law (Butterworths, 1993) 
at pp 491–496. 
38 Hope v Hope (1854) 43 ER 534 at 542. 
39 Re P (GE) (an infant) [1965] Ch 568 at 582. 
40 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. 
41 Sanjeev Sharma s/o Shri Sarvjeet Sharma v Surbhi Ahuja d/o Sh Virendra Kumar Ahuja 
[2015] 3 SLR 1056 at [12]. 
42 TGT v TGU [2015] SGHCF 10 at [19]. 
43 Re F (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1991] Fam 25 at 31. 
44 TDX v TDY [2015] 4 SLR 982 at [20]. 
45 BDA v BDB [2013] 1 SLR 607 at [24]. 
46 TDX v TDY [2015] 4 SLR 982 at [52]. 
47 TDX v TDY [2015] 4 SLR 982 at [33]. 
48 TDX v TDY [2015] 4 SLR 982 at [51]. 
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and if so where divorce proceedings are pending,49 and the “seat” of 
the father and mother’s relationship, among others.50 If the defendant 
succeeds in showing that there is a clearly more appropriate forum 
than Singapore, then a stay will ordinarily be granted. 
(b) At the second stage, the plaintiff may nonetheless persuade 
the court to refuse the stay of the Singapore court proceedings in 
favour of the more appropriate foreign court, if the plaintiff can 
establish that he will be denied of substantial justice should he 
pursue his claim in the foreign court. At this second stage, the court 
considers the question of potential delay or protraction in 
proceedings abroad,51 or the potentially less generous measure of 
child protection under the law that the foreign court would apply.52 
There does not appear to be any local decision concerning children 
in which a stay was refused on the ground that to do so would 
occasion substantial injustice. 
C. JURISDICTIONAL RULES UNDER THE 1996 CONVENTION 
25 In contrast to Singapore’s existing legal framework, the 1996 
Convention does not maintain the conceptual distinction between the 
existence and the exercise of jurisdiction. The existence of jurisdiction 
under the 1996 Convention settles the question.53 
1. The general rule: allocation of jurisdiction to the authorities of the 
child’s habitual residence 
26 The 1996 Convention intends to “centralise jurisdiction in the 
authorities of the child’s habitual residence and avoid all competition of 
authorities having concurrent jurisdiction”54 [emphasis added] by imposing 
“considerable limitations” 55 on the authorities of other Contracting States 
that are not the child’s habitual residence. This primary jurisdiction-
allocation rule is found in Article 5(1), which reads: 
The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the 
habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to 
the protection of the child’s person or property. [Emphasis added.] 
                                                   
49 AZS and another v AZR [2013] 3 SLR 700 at [13]. 
50 TDX v TDY [2015] 4 SLR 982 at [55]. 
51 Sanjeev Sharma s/o Shri Sarvjeet Sharma v Surbhi Ahuja d/o Sh Virendra Kumar Ahuja 
[2015] SGHC 104 at [48]–[50]; Mala Shukla v Jayant Amritanand Shukla (Danialle An, 
co-respondent) [2002] 1 SLR(R) 920 at [60]. 
52 TGT v TGU [2015] SGHCF 10. 
53 The authorities of the Contracting State still preserve some discretion under 
Articles 8 and 9 (see para 2.13(a) below) which may be considered analogous to that 
under the forum non conveniens principle. 
54 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 37. 
55 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 6. 
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The underlying premise is that it is ordinarily in the child’s best interest for 
the authorities of his habitual residence to determine issues concerning the 
child and his or her property.56 The 1996 Convention does not generally 
make provision for situations where the child’s habitual residence changes. 
The question of which authorities possess jurisdiction when a child’s 
habitual residence changes depends on where the child is habitually 
resident at any particular point in time. 
2. The concept of habitual residence 
27 “Habitual residence”, despite being the focal point of jurisdiction-
allocation in the 1996 Convention, 57 is left undefined by the Convention. 
The intention was to keep the concept of habitual residence fact-specific, to 
permit each authority to deal with cases on the basis of their own peculiar 
facts. In relation to the 1980 Convention which also utilises the concept, 
courts across jurisdictions have interpreted “habitual residence” 
differently.58 
28 Examples from various countries from various jurisdictions are set 
out below:59 
(a) In Austria, the Supreme Court held that a period of residence 
of more than six months in a State will ordinarily be characterized as 
habitual residence, even if it took place against the will of the 
custodian of the child.60 
(b) In Quebec, the Cour d’appel de Montréal held that the 
determination of the habitual residence of a child was a purely 
factual issue to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the 
case with regard to the reality of the child’s life, rather than that of 
his parents. The actual period of residence must have endured for a 
continuous and not insignificant period of time; the child must have 
a real and active link to the place, but there is no minimum period of 
residence which is specified.61 
                                                   
56 The Honourable Justice Victoria Bennett, “Complementarity Between the 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention and the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention: How 
the Conventions Support Each Other”, paper presented at The Well-Being of the Child 
through the Hague Child Abduction Convention and Protection of Children 
Convention: An Asia-Pacific Symposium (25 and 26 June 2015), at p 2. 
57 See Linda Silberman, “Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of a 
Global Jurisprudence” (2005) 38 University of California Davis Law Review 1049 at 
p 1064. 
58 In re J (a child) [2005] UKHL 40 at [31]. 
59 Taken from the database on the 1980 Convention, available at 
http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?act=search.detail&cid=800&1ng=1&s1=2 (accessed 
18 May 2017). 
60 8Ob121/03g (Oberster Gerichtshof). 
61 Droit de la famille 3713, No 500-09-010031-003. 
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(c) In Germany, habitual residence is also assessed by reference 
to the circumstances of the child. Thus, it was held by the 
Constitutional Court that the children in question had acquired a 
habitual residence in France, the place they were removed to, 
because the children had become integrated into the local 
environment in the nine months that they were there.62 
(d) In Israel, different approaches centring on the child’s objective 
circumstances63 and the parental intentions as to the permanency of 
a change in residency64 have been applied. 
(e) In England65 and Canada,66 parental intentions as to the 
permanency of a change in residency are at least a relevant, and in 
some cases, even a decisive, factor.67 This emphasis on parental 
intention has, however, relaxed in England of late, with the court 
opting instead for a more holistic and objective inquiry in line with 
European jurisprudence.68 
(f) In Australia69 and New Zealand,70 a wide variety of 
circumstances that bear upon the child’s habitual residence, 
including the past and present intentions of a child’s parents. There 
has, like in England, been a shift towards a holistic and objective 
inquiry that places less weight on the intentions of the parents. 
(g) In the United States, there has been no Supreme Court ruling 
as to the definition of habitual residence. The result has been that 
the various Courts of Appeals take slightly different approaches to 
the issue. The leading case in the Ninth Circuit emphasises the role 
of the settled parental intent to reside in a particular country, but 
takes into account objective facts pointing to the child’s 
acclimatisation.71 A different emphasis is reflected in an earlier 
decision of the Third Circuit,72 where the acclimatisation of the child 
to a particular place is the primary focus, with shared parental intent 
having a more limited role. In the first Court of Appeals decision to 
                                                   
62 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1206/98 (29 October 1998). 
63 GK v YK, Family Application 042721/06. 
64 Gabai v Gabai, P.D. 51(2)241, C.A. 7206/03. 
65 C v S (Minor: Abduction: Illegitimate Child) [1990] 2 FLR 442; B v H (Habitual 
Residence: Wardship) [2002] 1 FLR 388. 
66 DeHaan v Gracia [2004] AJ No 94 (QL). 
67 The Honourable Justice Kay, “The Hague Convention – Order or Chaos?”, paper 
presented at the Canadian National Judicial Institute International Judicial 
Conference on The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, La Malbaie, Québec (July 2004), at para 31. 
68 A v A (Children: Habitual Residence) [2014] AC 1 at [54(v)] per Lady Hale, with whom 
the rest of the court (including Lord Hughes at [81]) agreed. 
69 LK & Director-General, Department of Community Services (2009) 237 CLR 582  
at [32]–[35]. 
70 P v Secretary for Justice [2007] NZLR 40 at [88]. 
71 Mozes v Mozes 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). 
72 Feder v Evans-Feder 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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address the question of habitual residence, the Court of Appeals of 
the Sixth Circuit adopted a completely child-centric focus with the 
objective factual circumstances of the child to its environment being 
the only relevant concern.73 The selected approach has however 
sometimes been influenced by the particular circumstances of the 
case and often the age of the child.74 
29 Despite these nuances in the case law, the international trend is 
towards a holistic and objective inquiry, one that does not place undue 
emphasis on the subjective intentions of the parents, which was an 
approach that seemed to have some popularity in the past. This 
international trend is consistent with Singapore’s own jurisprudence on 
habitual residence. 
30 The Singapore court, in determining habitual residence for the 
purposes of the 1980 Convention, will consider: 75 
(a) where the child has been living; 
(b) how settled the child is in that country, including how 
integrated the child is to the country in terms of the environment, 
education system, culture, language and people around the child in 
that country; 
(c) where the child’s parents are habitually resident; 
(d) whether both parents had the joint intention that the child 
should reside there; and 
(e) the child’s age (this will also have a bearing on the emphasis 
placed on the subjective factors (the child’s and parents’ intentions) 
and objective factors (quality of residence)). 
31 At the Second Reading of the International Child Abduction Bill, the 
then-Minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports explained 
that habitual residence is determined by the child’s “personal ties to a 
place”, and while the list of relevant factors is not closed or exhaustive, the 
age and maturity of the child, the child’s own views, the child’s cultural 
affiliations, for instance, the language spoken or the country where the 
child has been in school the longest, are all relevant.76 
                                                   
73 Friedrich v Friedrich 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993). 
74 For a more extensive discussion of these cases and others, see Erin Gallagher, 
“A House is Not (Necessarily) A Home: A Discussion of the Common Law Approach to 
Habitual Residence”, (2015) 47 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Policy 463. 
75 TUC v TUD [2017] SGHCF 12 at [55], endorsing TDX v TDY [2015] 4 SLR 982 at [43]–[44] 
save for (d) (see [61]). 
76 Minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports to Parliament (Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (16 September 2010) vol 87 at cols 1269–1270, 
cited with approval in TUC v TUD [2017] SGHCF 12 at [52]. 
 
 Report on the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children 
 
 15 
3. Other bases of jurisdiction: concurrent jurisdiction exercised by 
the authorities of a Contracting State other than that of the child’s 
habitual residence 
32 Transferred jurisdiction. States may transfer cases in two situations: 
(a) Where the authorities of the child’s habitual residence are of 
the view that the authorities of another Contracting State are better 
placed to deal with the matter. The authorities of the Contracting 
State can either make a request directly to the authorities of that 
Contracting State to assume jurisdiction, or it can suspend 
consideration of the case and invite parties themselves to introduce 
a request before the authorities of that Contracting State. 77 The 
authorities of the more appropriate forum, and those of the child’s 
habitual residence, must consent to the former exercising 
jurisdiction on behalf of the latter.78 This provides for exceptions 
where the factual situation does not accord with the assumption of 
the Convention that the authorities of the child’s habitual residence 
are ordinarily the best-placed to make decisions in the best interests 
of the child.79 
(b) Where the authorities of another Contracting State are exercising 
divorce jurisdiction. In such situations, the authorities of the divorce 
jurisdiction may, concurrent with the authorities of the child’s 
habitual residence, take measures of protection if two conditions are 
satisfied:80 
(i) one of the child’s parents having parental responsibility 
habitually resides in the Contracting State whose authorities 
are exercising divorce jurisdiction; and 
(ii) the parents and any other third person with parental 
responsibility over the child accept that the Contracting State 
whose authorities are exercising divorce jurisdiction should 
be permitted take measures of protection, and that that is in 
the best interests of the child. 
If these conditions are satisfied, both the authorities of the State in 
which divorce proceedings are afoot and the State of the child’s 
habitual residence possess concurrent jurisdiction.81 This ground of 
                                                   
77 Articles 8 and 9, 1996 Convention. The other Contracting State must be a State (a) of 
which the child is a national; (b) in which the child’s property is located; (c) which is 
exercising divorce jurisdiction over the child’s parents; or (d) with which the child 
has a substantial connection: Article 8(2). 
78 Articles 8(4) and 9(3), 1996 Convention. 
79 See para 2.7 above. 
80 Article 10(1), 1996 Convention; Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at 
paras 64–65. 
81 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 63. 
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concurrent jurisdiction ceases the moment the divorce becomes final 
or the divorce proceedings terminate for any other reason.82 
33 Practical exigencies. For refugee, internationally-displaced children, 
or children whose habitual residence cannot be ascertained, the State in 
which the child is present have jurisdiction.83 
34 Measures of interim nature or in cases of urgency. The State where the 
child is present may, pending return to the habitual residence jurisdiction, 
deal with: 
(a) Situations of urgency. The authorities of a Contracting State in 
whose territory the child (or the child’s property) is present shall 
have jurisdiction to take such necessary measures of protection.84 
These measures are temporary and will lapse as soon as the 
authorities in the child’s habitual residence have addressed the same 
situation with corresponding measures.85 
(b) Interim measures concerning the child (or the child’s property) 
are sought. The authorities of the Contracting State on which the 
child or his or her property is present shall have jurisdiction to take 
such provisional measures for the protection of the person or 
property of the child.86 These measures have limited territorial effect. 
Again, they lapse when the authorities of the child’s habitual 
residence have addressed the same situation with corresponding 
measures.87 
35 Since the 1996 Convention contemplates situations of concurrent 
jurisdiction, this raises the question of how conflicts of jurisdiction in such 
cases are resolved. In cases where authorities assume jurisdiction on the 
basis of urgency or to grant interim measures (ie, at paras 30(a) and 
(b) above), there is a self-regulating mechanism; the orders lapse when the 
authorities of the child’s habitual residence assume jurisdiction and 
address the “same situation with corresponding measures”. 
36 In all other cases, when the authorities of more than one Contracting 
State are seized of jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention,88 the 1996 
Convention applies a first-seized rule. No other court shall exercise 
jurisdiction if, at the time of the commencement of proceedings before that 
                                                   
82 Article 10(2), 1996 Convention. 
83 Articles 6(1) and 6(2), 1996 Convention. 
84 An order for the return of the child to the country of his or her habitual residence is a 
“measure of protection” for the purposes of Article 11: see In re the matter of J 
(a child) [2015] UKSC 70 at [23]. 
85 Article 11(2), 1996 Convention. 
86 Article 12(1), 1996 Convention. 
87 Article 12(2), 1996 Convention. 
88 Articles 5–10, 1996 Convention. 
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court, corresponding measures have been requested from the court of 
another Contracting State with jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention.89 
D. HOW THE 1996 CONVENTION WILL CHANGE SINGAPORE’S 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
37 The 1996 Convention will replace the broad Spiliada analysis with a 
focus on (a) the habitual residence of the child in most cases; (b) transfer 
jurisdiction where exceptions apply; and (c) urgent and interim measures 
where a child habitually resident elsewhere is present. 
1. Focus on habitual residence; relinquishing Spiliada 
38 The greater focus on habitual residence would mean that, under the 
1996 Convention, there will be greater certainty which State has and will 
exercise jurisdiction to deal with measures of protection concerning the 
child. But there are two trade-offs for certainty. First, it will narrow the 
scope of considerations the court can take into account when deciding 
whether or not to hear a case. Under the present regime, assuming at least 
one of the broad bases of jurisdiction is satisfied, the Singapore court 
considers a host of factors when deciding whether there is another clearly 
more appropriate forum to hear a case. Under the 1996 Convention, the 
court must give its undivided attention to the child’s habitual residence. 
Second, the 1996 Convention does not have a ready equivalent to the 
substantial injustice proviso under the Spiliada test, which permits the 
court to hear the case notwithstanding a conclusion that it is forum non 
conveniens. The philosophy of the 1996 Convention is that substantial 
justice is done when the matter is heard by the most appropriate forum, 
namely, the authorities of the child’s habitual residence. Indeed, courts 
have remarked that, both as a matter of logic and principle, once a foreign 
court is found to be a more appropriate forum to hear a dispute, factors 
such as the reasonableness of each party’s actions should not be relevant 
to whether the forum court should nonetheless hear the case.90 
39 However, the 1996 Convention’s strong focus on the child’s habitual 
residence still permits the court to take into account a wide range of 
factors, to the extent that a determination as to the child’s habitual 
residence entails the court examining varied considerations touching on 
the child’s upbringing and well-being, and the parents intentions; it 
                                                   
89 Article 13(1), 1996 Convention. 
90 See, for example, Lewis v King [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 at [38]–[39]: 
… But we are not sure that we have grasped the idea of a principle which first 
enjoins ascertainment of the appropriate forum, but then allows the claimant to 
proceed in an inappropriate forum because he has acted reasonably in relation 
(for instance) to differential time bars applicable in the candidate jurisdictions. 
… However, Spiliada and [Metall und Rohstoff AG [1990] 1 QB 391] undoubtedly 
state the present law on this part of the case. … 
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permits—if not enjoins—the court to take a holistic view of the child’s 
welfare.91 
2. The transfer exceptions 
40 Traditionally, courts in the past have given primacy to the divorce 
court’s jurisdiction and matters concerning children are regarded as only 
ancillary to the divorce. Thus, in relation to the existence of jurisdiction, a 
court exercising its divorce jurisdiction does not require any other 
connection to a child of the marriage in order to be able to make orders in 
relation to the child’s welfare.92 Where the exercise of jurisdiction is 
concerned, common law courts place tremendous emphasis on the 
desirability of having a divorce court hear all matters arising out of the 
divorce, including matters relating to a child of the marriage.93 The 
introduction of the 1996 Convention will shift the philosophical approach 
from one centred on the court’s divorce jurisdiction to one that emphasises 
the interests of the child. Article 10 is engaged only “under rather strict 
conditions”.94 Article 10 can only be invoked if one of the parents is also 
habitually resident in that other Contracting State,95 and both parents agree 
that that court should have concurrent jurisdiction.96 
 
Case example: Re A (an infant)97 
A French father and Moroccan mother married in Paris where they had a 
daughter. The family moved to Singapore when the daughter was 4 years of 
age. The relationship between the father and mother began to fray when the 
daughter was 6 years of age. The mother brought an application under the 
Guardianship of Infants Act for custody, care and control of the daughter. The 
following day, the father commenced a similar action in Singapore, also under 
the same Act, and simultaneously filed for divorce in Paris. Three months after 
the commencement of legal proceedings, the mother brought the daughter from 
Singapore to London, where they resided thereafter. 
The question before the Singapore court was whether the issue of interim 
custody ought to be heard in Singapore or in Paris. The High Court held that 
that the French court emerged as “pre-eminently more appropriate” and thus 
stayed the father’s application for interim custody in Singapore.98 The court 
took into account the fact that there were proceedings afoot in France that the 
                                                   
91 See para 2.11 above. 
92 See para 2.3(a) above. 
93 Law Reform Committee, Report on Ancillary Orders After Foreign Divorce or Annulment 
(July 2009) at para 38. 
94 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 37. 
95 Article 10(1)(a), 1996 Convention. 
96 Article 10(1)(b), 1996 Convention. 
97 [2002] 1 SLR(R) 570. 
98 Re A (an infant) [2002] SLR(R) 570 at [16]. 
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husband himself had commenced, that the French court had made orders in 
relation to the custody of the daughter, and that it would have been more 
convenient for evidence relevant to the determination of the matter to be 
produced in France.99 
If the 1996 Convention had applied, on the hypothesis that Singapore, France 
and the UK were Contracting States to the 1996 Convention, the foremost 
consideration would have been the habitual residence of the child. The court 
in Re A held that Singapore was the habitual residence of the daughter prior to 
her removal to London. After her removal and at the time of the proceedings, 
her habitual residence had switched to London.100 Article 10 conditions would 
not have been met in any event for the case to continue in Singapore: the 
mother was no longer habitually resident in Singapore. 
41 A focus on the child, however, will mean that courts will recognise, in 
any event, that it is not necessarily ideal to have the divorce court hear all 
matters arising out of the divorce. Parties may seek to elect a jurisdiction 
for the distribution of assets in a divorce (for example, in pre-nuptial 
agreements). Whilst the chosen jurisdiction may be selected because it is 
ideally placed to deal with the assets of the parties in the divorce, it may 
have little or no connection to the children of the marriage. Further, if the 
children are not habitually resident in that jurisdiction, orders made by the 
divorce court may have little or no useful effect. 
42 The second category of transfer jurisdiction permits authorities of 
the child’s habitual residence to request to transfer jurisdiction to the 
authorities of another Contracting State which would be “better placed in 
the particular case to assess the best interests of the child”.101 This gives 
the courts of habitual residence a greater leeway to deal with a child, where 
the other Contracting State is one of which the child is a national, is one in 
which the property of the child is located, is one which is seized of divorce 
proceedings, or is a State with which the child has a substantial 
connection.102 The requested Contracting State must also agree to assume 
jurisdiction on the basis that it considers the transfer of jurisdiction is in 
the child’s best interest.103 
3. Urgent and interim measures 
43 The State in which a child is present is given jurisdiction to make 
urgent and interim measures, even if it is not the jurisdiction of the child’s 
habitual residence. This form of jurisdiction could have great practical 
significance. When a child is sought to be returned to another jurisdiction, 
                                                   
99 Re A (an infant) [2002] SLR(R) 570 at [17]–[19]. 
100 Re A (an infant) [2002] SLR(R) 570 at [5]. 
101 Article 8(1), 1996 Convention. 
102 Article 8(2), 1996 Convention. 
103 Article 8(4), 1996 Convention. 
 
Report on the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children  
 
20 
the authorities of the Contracting State in which the child is present may 
take measures of protection in cases of urgency. These protective measures 
are themselves eligible for recognition and enforcement under the 1996 
Convention. These can be declared enforceable or registered abroad, and 
will remain effective until such time that corresponding orders are made by 
the court exercising pre-eminent jurisdiction.104 
44 Such measures, which has been described as a “very helpful” tool to 
secure a “soft landing” for children who are ordered to return,105 are best 
made by the State which the child is in.106 For example, that court can take 
steps to locate the child, and it is also likely to be better placed to 
understand and learn about the child’s current circumstances. That court 
can also exert its coercive powers directly on the parent located in its 
jurisdiction, or even on the child if necessary. These are undoubtedly more 
efficaciously undertaken by the court of the State where the child is 
present, rather than the court or authorities of the child’s habitual 
residence, whose orders may then have to be enforced in the court of the 
State where the child is present. In some cases, these delays or inability to 
take effective timely action may comprise the protection of the child’s 
interest to be returned to his or her habitual residence. 
45 The concept of urgency is not defined.107 This has led to some 
ambiguity in Article 11’s application.108 It has been suggested that a 
situation of urgency is present when there is the risk of “irreparable harm 
for the child” if remedial measures were sought through the normal 
channels prescribed by Articles 5 to 10 of the 1996 Convention.109 The basis 
of this concurrent jurisdiction is “protection or interests of the child” which 
may be compromised if measures were only permitted to be obtained from 
the authorities of the child’s habitual residence.110 English courts, however, 
adopt a broader approach, as seen in the case example below. 
 
                                                   
104 Hans van Loon (former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law), “The Brussels IIa Regulations: Towards a Review?”, cited in In re J 
(a child) [2005] UKHL 40 at [31]. 
105 In the matter of J (a child) [2015] UKSC 70 at [31]. 
106 In the matter of J (a child) [2015] UKSC 70 at [39]. 
107 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 68. 
108 See Rhona Schuz, “Habitual Residence of Children under the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention – Theory and Practice” (2001) 13 Child and Family Law Quarterly 1. 
109 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 68. 
110 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 68. The example given is 
of a child who has to undergo an urgent surgical operation, or a matter concerning 
the child’s property in the form of perishable goods. 
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Case example: In re the matter of J (a child)111 
The proceedings concerned a child who was born in January 2008, to parents 
from Morocco who held dual Moroccan-British citizenships. They lived in 
England when the child was born. They then moved to Saudi Arabia in 2009 
and then back to Morocco in 2011. 
The marriage broke down in December 2011, whereupon the child lived with 
the mother; the father was given access to the child. The mother returned to 
London in January 2013, but the child remained in Morocco under the care of 
the maternal grandparents for some months after. The child was then brought 
back to the UK by the mother. Shortly after, the father applied to the Family 
Court in Morocco for residential custody of the child. The father then brought 
proceedings in the English High Court, seeking an order that the child be 
made a ward of court and returned summarily to Morocco. 
The judge found that the child was habitually resident in Morocco. He also 
found that the father had not consented to the child’s removal and so the 
mother’s bringing the child to the UK was wrongful. The judge ordered the 
child’s immediate return. The return order was, however, not made under the 
1980 Convention because, while Morocco had acceded to the 1980 
Convention, the European Union, and thus, the UK, had not accepted 
Morocco’s accession. The 1980 Convention was thus inapplicable. The 1996 
Convention, however, applied because both the UK and Morocco were States 
parties to that Convention. 
The judge was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which held that the judge did 
not have a jurisdictional basis upon which he was entitled to make the orders 
he made. The Court of Appeal held that Article 11 was inapplicable because a 
return order was neither urgent nor necessary. There was delay in the father’s 
bringing proceedings in both Morocco and the UK, and so this could not be a 
case of urgency. 
The Court of Appeal was reversed by the UK Supreme Court. A unanimous 
court noted that Article 11 of the 1996 Convention contained neither the 
words “irreparable harm” nor “compromising the protection or interest of the 
child”. Rather, the 1996 Convention “merely asks” whether the measure sought 
is “necessary and the case urgent”.112 
                                                   
111 [2015] UKSC 70 at [1]. 
112 In re the matter of J (a child) [2015] UKSC 70 at [38]. 
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The UK Supreme Court also clarified that it was not a precondition of urgency 
that the applicant for the measure of protection could not make the same 
request before the authorities of the child’s habitual residence. In the court’s 
opinion, if a child required protection immediately, the courts of the country 
where the child was located ought not to refrain from granting the protection 
while inquiries were made into the possibility of bringing proceedings in the 
home country.113 The court reasoned that such jurisdiction could and ought to 
be exercised, for example, in a case involving a child caught up in a situation 
of domestic violence, even if it had not been shown to be impossible for the 
authorities of the habitual residence to take measures of protection.114 
                                                   
113 In re the matter of J (a child) [2015] UKSC 70 at [29]. 
114 In re the matter of J (a child) [2015] UKSC 70 at [30]. 
 
 Report on the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children 
 
 23 
CHAPTER 3 
EXTENDING RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
46 The 1996 Convention allows the recognition and enforcement of local 
orders in other Convention countries, and vice versa. 
A. SINGAPORE’S CURRENT PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
FRAMEWORK 
47 At present, there is no reciprocal recognition or enforcement 
framework in place. A Singapore court’s orders are not automatically 
recognised or enforced overseas. Nor is a Singapore court bound to 
recognise, enforce or give effect to a foreign measure of protection, 
although it can do so if it chooses to. 
48 As with many other jurisdictions, a Singapore court may make a 
“mirror” order, but the guiding principle is that “the benefit of the infant, 
which is the foundation of the jurisdiction, must be the test of its right 
exercise”.115 Foreign measures “at best are treated with respect but not as 
binding”.116 The court is not bound to recognise the status of any foreign 
guardian.117 The court is entitled to disregard a foreign guardian and 
appoint another.118 Although there appears to be some limited scope for 
recognising the validity of the appointment of the foreign guardian under 
the lex domicilii of the child,119 that foreign guardian is nonetheless still 
“[subject to] and [limited] according to the lex fori”.120 A foreign custody 
order in relation to the child made by a judicial authority abroad also does 
not bind the Singapore court.121 If the court does not enter into the merits of 
the question afresh and form an independent judgment of where the infant’s 
welfare lies, it would be a “negation of the proposition … that the infant’s 
welfare is the paramount consideration”.122 
                                                   
115 Stuart v Bute (1861) 9 HLC 440 at 463. 
116 The Honourable Peter Nygh, “The New Hague Child Protection Convention”, (1997) 
11 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 344 at p 358, commenting on the 
largely similar common law position in England & Wales. 
117 Johnstone v Beattie (1843) 10 Cl & F 42. 
118 Stuart v Bute (1861) 9 HLC 440 at 464–465. 
119 Re Chatard’s Settlement [1899] 1 Ch 712. 
120 Tan Yock Lin, Conflict Issues in Family and Succession Law (Butterworths, 1993) at 
p 502. 
121 McKee v McKee [1951] AC 352; ZP v PS (1994) 181 CLR 639. 
122 McKee v McKee [1951] AC 352 at 364. 
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B. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE 1996 
CONVENTION 
49 In contrast, under the 1996 Convention, where the Singapore court 
exercises jurisdiction under the Convention, Singapore court orders will 
automatically gain recognition and bite in all other Contracting States. The 
widespread recognition and enforceability of the orders made by the 
Singapore court, when it has jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention, will be 
an important advantage that will place the Singapore court well to deal with 
cases involving international elements. 
1. Recognition 
50 The general rule is that measures of protection taken in one 
Contracting State are automatically recognised in every other Contracting 
State.123 This is useful in situations where the party in whose favour a 
measure is made is empowered to take unilateral steps in another 
Contracting State. For example, a legal representative who has been 
conferred powers to act on the child’s behalf may enter into transactions 
on behalf of the child in the foreign State without needing to enforce in the 
foreign State the measure conferred on him or her.124 
51 Exceptions. The rapid and automatic nature of the enforcement 
provisions is nonetheless attenuated by the presence of exceptions to 
enforcement, which is characteristic of most reciprocal enforcement 
regimes. The 1996 Convention enumerates exhaustive grounds on which 
the recognition of measures of protection may be refused.125 These are 
where: 
(a) The measure was made by an authority which did not have the 
requisite jurisdiction to do so. A measure may be refused recognition if 
the authority that granted the measure did not have jurisdiction on 
the grounds prescribed by the 1996 Convention. The width of this 
exception will depend on whether a finding of habitual residence—
the pre-eminent basis for assuming jurisdiction under the 1996 
Convention—is characterised as a determination of fact, of law, or of 
mixed fact and law.126 
                                                   
123 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 119. 
124 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 132. 
125 Article 32(2), 1996 Convention. 
126 Based on the general approach of the Hague Conventions, it may be that what 
amounts to “habitual residence” is a legal determination and not a finding of fact for 
purposes of Article 25 of the 1996 Convention. The Explanatory Report to the 1996 
Convention, when discussing Article 25, makes a distinction between an assessment 
of habitual residence, and the facts on which such assessment is based (at para. 131). 
Further, the following explanation is provided in Peter Nygh &Fausto Pocar Report on 
the Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (August 2000) at p 107 provides the following explanation on 
a provision similar to Article 25: “Similar questions may arise in relation to habitual 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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(b) The measure was granted without the child having been given 
an opportunity to be heard. This denial must amount to a violation of 
the fundamental principles of procedure of the Contracting State in 
which recognition is sought. While the Explanatory Report clarifies 
that this exception does not “imply that the child ought to be heard 
in every case”,127 and the Handbook states that 1996 Convention 
“does not seek to amend national procedural rules regarding hearing 
children”,128 the breadth of this exception has a potentially wide 
variance across Contracting States depending on the degree of 
consultation with the child that is required by the particular 
Contracting States.129 In Germany, for example, extensive provision is 
made for listening to children before measures concerning them are 
taken. In the Tiemann case,130 the German Constitutional Court held 
that for applications under the 1980 Convention, even in situations of 
a re-abduction, it was incumbent on the court to first listen to the 
child either directly or through its representative. In Singapore, child 
participation is generally a matter of the court’s discretion.131 
Singapore courts will need to bear in mind, in 1996 Convention cases, 
a consideration of the child’s views, whether through a Child 
Representative or judicial or counsellor interview or report. 
(c) The measure concerns a person’s parental responsibility and 
that person was not given an opportunity to be heard. This is related to 
the exception in the preceding sub-paragraph, and a specific 
manifestation of the fundamental requirement of natural justice. 
(d) The measure is manifestly contrary to public policy, taking into 
account the best interests of the child. The “manifestly contrary to 
public policy” formulation is ubiquitous in international instruments. 
But the 1996 Convention requires this question to be considered with 
specific reference to the best interests of the child. This formulation 
was adopted from the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.132 
The 1993 Convention does not prescribe how the exception is to be 
applied, but it is “understood that the notion of public policy shall be 
                                                                                                                                                  
residence. A finding that a person has physically stayed at a particular place will be 
binding, but the deduction therefrom that this constitutes habitual residence will not 
(emphasis added).” In any case, Article 25 is still a departure from the common law, 
whereby the requested court must ascertain for itself the underlying facts for the 
purpose of determining international jurisdiction. 
127 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 123. 
128 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Practice Handbook on the Operation 
of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention at para 10.6. 
129 Nigel Lowe, “The 1996 Hague Convention on the protection of children – a fresh 
appraisal”, (2002) 14(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 191 at p 202. 
130 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 28 October 1998, JZ 1999 at 459. 
131 Thus in AZB v AZC [2016] SGHCF 1, the High Court said at [24] that while judicial 
interviews of children were “an important option”, “[i]nterviewing children may not 
always be the best way to proceed”. 
132 Article 24. 
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interpreted very restrictively”.133 The exact same formulation is also 
adopted as an exception to the recognition of a judgment by the 
Brussels II bis regulation,134 which regulates private international law 
rules between EU Member States in relation to family law matters. 
The Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Justice in what 
appears to be the only reported decision on this provision held that 
it “must be interpreted strictly”.135 The exception would only be 
engaged “where, taking into account the best interests of the child, 
recognition of the judgment given in another Member State would be 
at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the 
State in which recognition is sought, in that it would infringe a 
fundamental principle”.136 In that case, the Fourth Chamber decided 
on the reference that an error of law was insufficient to trigger the 
operation of the exception.137 
(e) The measure is incompatible with a later measure taken in a 
non-Contracting State of the child’s habitual residence. This is 
contingent on the later measure of the non-Contracting State being 
recognisable under the Contracting State’s rules for recognition 
(independent of the grounds in the 1996 Convention). This is a 
limited exception needed only for situations involving non-
Contracting States, because the 1996 Convention addresses the 
situation of later incompatible measures as between Contracting 
States. 
(f) The measure does not comply with the requirements in 
Article 33 of the 1996 Convention. This is a specific procedural 
requirement that applies to measures ordering that a child be moved 
to foster care, or kafala. 
52 A Contracting State is also precluded from examining the merits of 
the measure in question when deciding whether to refuse recognition.138 It 
should be noted, however, that even if a ground for refusing recognition is 
established, the authorities of the Contracting State nonetheless have the 
power to still recognise the measure if it is in the interests of the welfare of 
the child.139 
53 Since measures of protection are recognised automatically, it is 
incumbent on the party challenging recognition to commence legal 
                                                   
133 G Parra-Aranguren, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Protection of Children 
and Cooperation in respect of Intercountry Adoption (31 December 1993) at para 426 
134 Article 23(a), Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (27 November 2003). 
135 P v Q, Case C-455/15 PPU (19 November 2015) at para 36. 
136 P v Q, Case C-455/15 PPU (19 November 2015) at para 39. 
137 The alleged error was that a Lithuanian court had wrongfully exercised jurisdiction 
over a Swedish child that had been removed to Lithuania. 
138 Article 27, 1996 Convetion. 
139 Art 23(2), 1996 Convention; Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at 
para 121. 
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proceedings before a court refuses to recognise a measure made by the 
court of another Contracting State. Such proceedings may be brought by 
“any interested person”, in accordance with the procedural rules of the 
Contracting State.140 
2. Declaration of enforceability and registration 
54 When recognition of a measure in the foreign Contracting State is 
insufficient, and enforcement is required, or anticipated to be so, an 
“interested party” may request the foreign Contracting State to declare the 
measure enforceable or registered for the purpose of enforcement.141 The 
procedure for processing this request is entirely up to the Contracting State 
to determine, so long as it is “simple and rapid”.142 A declaration of 
enforceability or registration of the measure may only be refused if one of 
the grounds for refusing recognition is established.143 It follows from this 
that the foreign Contracting State retains the power to declare enforceable 
or register a measure notwithstanding that a ground for refusing 
recognition is made out. 
55 The mechanism to obtain a declaration of enforceability in another 
Contracting State will be useful in situations of relocation. It will permit a 
parent to pre-emptively obtain recognition of a measure by the Contracting 
State to which relocation is sought. For example, a mother with three 
children may wish to relocate to another Contracting State. The father may 
not object, on condition that he is able to maintain access to the children 
on the terms ordered by the court of the Contracting State in which they 
currently reside. The father may seek recognition of the measure in the 
other Contracting State before agreeing to the mother and children’s move 
to that jurisdiction.144 In practical terms, the court seized of the relocation 
application would take measures (or make orders) for relocation but with 
recognition under Article 24 being a condition precedent to the child 
leaving the jurisdiction. The court determining the relocation issue could 
also reserve liberty to the parties to re-open the case in the event that 
recognition is not granted, and either or both seek alternative orders. 
 
                                                   
140 Article 24, 1996 Convention. 
141 Article 26(1), 1996 Convention. 
142 Articles 26(1) and 26(2), 1996 Convention; see also Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report 
(15 January 1997) at para 132. 
143 Article 26(3), 1996 Convention. 
144 HCCH, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention, Example 10(1). 
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Case example: Cape v Cape145 
The proceedings concerned an application by a mother to relocate a child to 
Germany from Australia. The Australian Full Court heard the case, and 
permitted the mother to relocate the child to Germany pending the 
determination of an appeal against orders permitting the relocation. One of 
the conditions to such relocation was the mother executing an undertaking as 
a protective measure pursuant to the 1996 Convention that she would return 
the child to Australia in the event that the father’s appeal was successful. The 
mother could remove the child providing she first obtained, from a court of 
competent jurisdiction in Germany, either recognition of orders pursuant to 
Article 24 or a declaration of enforceability or registration pursuant to Article 
26 of the 1996 Convention. 
3. Enforcement 
56 Once a measure is declared enforceable or is registered in the foreign 
Contracting State, it shall be enforced in that State as if it were a measure 
that had been taken by the authorities of that Contracting State.146 
57 The 1996 Convention is nevertheless alive to the possibility that the 
enforcement of a foreign measure may not always be in the best interest of 
the child.147 For example, suppose the authorities of the child’s habitual 
residence have kept, as a measure, the child with his family while placing 
the family under the supervision of the local social authorities. The family 
later settles in another Contracting State, and the measure is to be enforced 
there. No issues arise if the relevant authorities in the second Contracting 
State are similarly authorised under their law to carry out the task of 
supervising the child’s family. However, practice difficulties will arise if the 
laws of the foreign State do not provide the local social authorities with 
such authorisation. In such situations, the suggestion is that the authorities 
of the second Contracting State should adapt the measure after 
consultation with the authorities of the original Contracting State, if 
possible, or alternatively, exercise its jurisdiction to modify the measure 
accordingly.148 
                                                   
145 [2013] FamCAFC 114. 
146 Article 28, 1996 Convention. 
147 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 135. 
148 Under Art 5(2), 1996 Convention; see also Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report 
(15 January 1997) at para 135. 
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C. HOW THE 1996 CONVENTION WILL CHANGE SINGAPORE’S 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
58 The ratification of the 1996 Convention will help orders made by the 
Singapore court gain increased efficacy in other Contracting States. The 
trade-off is the reciprocity Singapore courts must give to Contracting State 
orders. The court will only be able to do so if one of the specified grounds 
for non-recognition is established. These grounds under the 1996 
Convention were deliberately narrowed and tightened from the grounds for 
a refusal of return under the 1980 Convention.149 
59 Curbing the court’s power to disregard in its entirety foreign orders 
concerning children is a progressive rather than regressive step. The 
recognition and enforcement rules flow from antiquated choice of law rules 
which require courts to apply without exception the lex fori in the form of 
the welfare principle. This rule originates in 19th century legislation when, 
presumably, international family law issues were not at the forefront of the 
drafters’ minds.150 The historical reason for why the court adopted a 
parochial approach to foreign laws and orders made by courts abroad lies 
in the theory of the sovereign as parens patriae.151 The sovereign is “bound 
to look to the maintenance and proper education of all its subjects”.152 Yet 
the court’s modern guardianship and wardship jurisdiction extends far 
beyond its subjects (ie, nationals).153 It is questionable whether the parens 
patriae justification continues to be a convincing one. 
60 It is therefore desirable as a matter of principle for the Singapore 
court to give presumptive weight to an order made by a court of the child’s 
habitual residence, providing that all parties were accorded procedural 
fairness.154 This must be a necessary consequence of acknowledging that 
the authorities of the child’s habitual residence are ordinarily the best 
placed to decide what the welfare of the child entails. This will also prevent 
parents from attempting to re-litigate matters by bringing a matter 
concerning a child before the Singapore court, despite it having been 
already determined by a foreign court. 
                                                   
149 Nigel Lowe and Michael Nicholls, “The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of 
Children”, (2002) Family Law 102 at p 105; the breadth of the exceptions to return 
under the 1980 Convention is seen as one of its major shortcomings. 
150 Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 (c 27). 
151 Tan Yock Lin, Conflicts Issues in Family and Succession Law (Butterworths, 1993) 
remarks at p 496. 
152 Hope v Hope (1854) 4 De GM & G 328 at 345. 
153 Tan Yock Lin, Conflicts Issues in Family and Succession Law (Butterworths, 1993) 
remarks at p 494 that: 
An enlightened jurisprudence would baulk at any suggestion that the 
jurisdiction is restricted to subjects. Can the sovereign in all good conscience 
stand by while a child, not a subject, is being ill-treated within its jurisdiction? 
The answer is obvious. 
154 What procedural fairness requires, however, may vary from country to country, that 
may create difficulties, which are alluded to at para 3.6(a) above. 
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61 Another point that arises is the extent to which the court will be 
required to defer to the findings of the prior court on the question of the 
child’s habitual residence, when the enforcing court is deciding whether or 
not the prior court had jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention. This is 
especially important in relation to the prior court’s determination on the 
question of the child’s habitual residence, since that is the pre-eminent 
basis for assuming jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention. 
62 The extent to which the enforcing court will have to defer to the 
findings of the prior court will depend on whether a determination on 
habitual residence is characterised as a factual determination, as opposed 
to a legal determination. Article 25 of the 1996 Convention states that 
“[t]he authority of the requested State is bound by the findings of fact on 
which the authority of the State where the measure was taken based its 
jurisdiction” [emphasis added]. If a determination on habitual residence is 
characterised as a finding of fact then Article 25 will preclude that 
determination from being re-opened at the enforcement or recognition 
stage. 
63 Some jurisdictions take the view that a determination of habitual 
residence is a pure question of fact. For example, the Australian Attorney-
General’s Department observed:155 
Habitual residence is a question of fact to be determined by reference to all 
the circumstances of a particular case. In relation to a child, relevant 
considerations include the intention of the parents and the length of time 
the child has resided in the country. The concept must remain capable of 
application to a wide variety of factual situations and it is unlikely that any 
exhaustive definition could usefully be devised. 
64 But this may be an overly simplistic characterisation of the matter, 
and it is unlikely that a common law court will construe the determination 
of habitual residence as a determination of fact. It is crucial to distinguish 
between the factual incidents which form the basis of the assessment of 
habitual residence, and the inference or judgment in reaching the legal 
conclusion of the child’s habitual residence. The former is certainly a 
question of fact. But the latter is a question of law and legal judgment. 
65 The nature of a determination of habitual residence is what appears 
to have divided the United Kingdom Supreme Court in In the matter of 
B (A Child).156 Lord Wilson, who delivered the majority opinion, appears to 
have assumed that a child’s habitual residence was a question of fact to be 
determined by a fact-finder; but that in doing so, the fact-finder may have 
regard to certain “expectations”, or rules of thumb as to when habitual 
                                                   
155 See also Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, Hague Conference on Private International Law (1980) III 
Actes et Documents de la Quartorzième Session 426 at p 445. 
156 [2016] UKSC 4. 
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residence will or will not be satisfied.157 The concurring joint opinion of 
Lady Hale and Lord Toulson stated explicitly that “[a]t the risk of appearing 
pedantic, we would prefer to describe it as a mixed question of fact and law, 
because the concept is a matter of law but its application is a matter of 
fact”.158 (This does not sit easily with Lady Hale’s own pronouncement three 
years earlier that “All are agreed that habitual residence is a question of 
fact and not a legal concept such as domicile.”159) in Lord Sumption’s 
dissent (with which Lord Clarke agreed) viewed it as an “essentially factual 
enquiry” but decried the majority for introducing a “classic legal construct” 
that had no place in a factual determination.160 
                                                   
157 In the matter of B (A Child) [2016] UKSC 4 at [46]. 
158 In the matter of B (A Child) [2016] UKSC 4 at [57]. 
159 In the matter of A (Children) (AP) [2013] UKSC 60 at [54(i)]. 
160 In the matter of B (A Child) [2016] UKSC 4 at [75]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 1980 CONVENTION 
66 The 1980 Child Abduction Convention was incorporated into 
Singapore law161 by the International Child Abduction Act.162 The 1996 
Convention complements and supports its operation. 
A. BACKGROUND ON THE 1980 CONVENTION 
67 The 1980 Convention has a single object: the return of children who 
are removed or retained from their country of “habitual residence”. A Court 
is bound to order the return of a child to their “habitual residence” if a 
parent retains or removes a child away from their “habitual residence” in 
breach of their custody rights.163 
68 This obligation to return the child is subject to the following 
exceptions: 
(a) Where the proceedings for return are commenced more than a 
year after the date of this wrongful removal or retention and the 
child is settled in its new environment.164 
(b) Where the wrongful removal or retention was consented to or 
subsequently acquiesced in by the other parent.165 
(c) Where the other parent was not exercising custody rights at 
the time of the removal or retention.166 
(d) Where there is a grave risk that the return to the habitual 
residence would expose the child to physical or psychological harm 
or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.167 
(e) Where the child objects to being returned and has attained an 
age or maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its 
views.168 
                                                   
161 Singapore acceded to the 1980 Convention on 28 December 2010. 
162 Cap 143, 2011 Rev Ed. 
163 Article 3, 1980 Convention. 
164 Article 12, 1980 Convention. 
165 Article 13(a), 1980 Convention. 
166 Article 13(a), 1980 Convention. 
167 Article 13(b), 1980 Convention. 
168 Article 13, 1980 Convention. 
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B. COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN THE 1980 AND 1996 
CONVENTIONS 
69 The 1996 Convention complements and supports the working of the 
1980 Convention in the following ways. 
1. Preservation of “habitual residence” 
70 Wrongful removal and retention bears the same meaning in this 
context as it does under the 1980 Convention.169 In situations of wrongful 
removal or retention, the authorities of the Contracting State in which the 
child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in only obtain jurisdiction 
under the 1996 Convention upon satisfaction of the following requirements: 
(a) the child has acquired habitual residence in the latter Contracting State; 
and (b) all relevant persons have acquiesced in the child’s wrongful 
removal or retention, or at least one year has elapsed since all relevant 
persons first had knowledge of the removal or retention.170 
2. Safe harbour orders when return order has been made under the 
1980 Convention 
71 Under the 1980 Convention, the court making the return order does 
not have any powers to make orders for the interim protection of the child 
pending the making of orders by the courts of the habitual residence. The 
question arises as to what happens in a scenario where: (a) a child has 
been ordered to be returned to the habitual residence under the 1980 
Convention; but (b) the courts of the habitual residence have yet to be 
seized of custody issues as no proceedings have been commenced there. In 
these situations, the 1996 Convention would allow the Contracting State to 
take concurrent jurisdiction of the matter to order urgent measures that 
would complement the return order made under the 1980 Convention.171 
These orders, also known as “safe harbour” orders, would normally impose 
conditions for the protection of the child which would have effect 
immediately upon the return of the child to the habitual residence and 
pending the courts of the habitual residence ordering measures of their 
own. 
                                                   
169 See Explanatory Report at para 50. See also Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Hague Conference on 
Private International Law (1980) III Actes et Documents de la Quartorzième 
Session 426 at paras 64–74. 
170 Article 7(1), 1996 Convention. 
171 Article 11, 1996 Convention. 
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3. Wider solutions when a return order is not made under the 1980 
Convention 
72 The 1980 Convention presents a straightforward solution for return 
where a child is wrongly removed to or retained in another Contracting 
State. However, once a court orders that the child should not be returned, 
there nothing to prevent that court from assuming jurisdiction and making 
orders in relation to the welfare of the child, notwithstanding that it may 
not be from the State of the child’s habitual residence. 
73 The 1996 Convention ameliorates this problem, firstly, by preventing 
the State from assuming “default jurisdiction” to determine custody matters 
once they have decided that the Child does not need to be returned under 
the 1980 Convention.172 The 1996 Convention tackles this problem directly 
by giving pre-eminent jurisdiction to the child’s habitual residence.173 
74 Secondly, the 1996 Convention provides parties with a wider range of 
solutions, including the means to communicate through the respective 
judicial and administrative authorities, to ensure that orders relating to the 
welfare of the child can be made. 
 
Case example: State Central Authority v Thomas174 
The mother was alleged to have wrongfully removed two young children from 
Austria to Australia in November 2012. Her position was that the parties had 
reached an agreement allowing her to do so at a settlement conference in 
Austria. The father disputed that any such agreement was reached. There was 
litigation in Austria which both the father and mother vigorously contested. 
The father also applied to the court in Australia for a return of the child. 
In the Austrian proceedings, the Austrian courts appeared to agree with the 
mother, and as such, the decisions of the Austrian courts countenanced, and 
were even predicated on, the fact that the children would remain in Australia. 
Yet, there were no exceptions to a return under the 1980 Convention, which 
may have justified the Australian court refusing to grant a return order, 
despite the position that the Austrian courts had taken. 
The Austrian and Australian courts went on to exchange information and 
communicate through the channels made available by the 1996 Convention. 
The Australian court eventually took jurisdiction under Article 7 of the 1996 
Convention, and was able to make orders relating to the child’s welfare. 
                                                   
172 Gloria Folger DeHart, “Relationship between the 1980 Child Abduction Convention 
and the 1996 Protection Convention” (2000) New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 83, at p 85. 
173 Article 5, 1996 Convention. 
174 State Central Authority & Thomas (No 1) [2014] FamCA 195; State Central Authority & 
Thomas (No 2) [2014] FamCA 196. 
 
 Report on the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children 
 
 35 
4. Alternative mechanisms for return orders to be made 
75 While more states have signed up to the 1980 Convention (93 states) 
than the 1996 Convention (45 states), the 1980 Convention is not 
enforceable between all the 1980 Convention States. This is due to a 
difference in the procedure for international accession under both 
Conventions: 
(a) The 1980 Convention utilises an “opt-in” approach where a 
Contracting State must agree to another Contracting States’ 
accession in order for the 1980 Convention to apply between those 
states.175 
(b) The 1996 Convention, by contrast, utilises an “opt-out” 
approach where it will apply to all member states unless one 
Contracting State explicitly raises an objection to the accession of 
another state.176 
76 The “gap” in acceptance of Singapore’s accession to the 1980 
Convention is not small. Only 58 out of the 97 other member states of the 
1980 Convention have accepted Singapore’s accession. Some of the 
remaining states that have not accepted Singapore’s accession are also 
parties to the 1996 Convention such as Albania, Armenia, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Georgia, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Russia, and Turkey. If a 
member state under the 1980 Convention has not yet accepted Singapore’s 
accession to the 1980 Convention, the 1996 Convention may also provide an 
alternative mechanism to secure the return of the child, because the 
recognition and enforcement provisions would compel other Contracting 
States to the 1996 Convention to recognise a return order made by the 
Singapore court (independent of the 1980 Convention). 
5. Robust enforcement of access rights 
77 The 1980 Convention permits a parent to file an application to make 
arrangements for organising or securing the effective exercise of rights of 
access. These provisions in respect of access, however, are not as 
prescriptive as those relating to the return of a child. Secondly, while the 
1980 Convention states that the Central Authorities of a Contracting State 
may initiate or assist in proceedings aimed at securing access rights,177 it is 
not clear if this imposes an obligation for mutual recognition of access 
orders between Courts of Contracting States. These issues are more 
robustly addressed by the recognition and enforcement provisions of the 
1996 Convention which provide for automatic recognition and enforcement 
of (access) orders made by the habitual residence of the child. 
                                                   
175 Article 38, 1980 Convention. 
176 Article 58(3), 1996 Convention. 
177 Article 21, 1980 Convention. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CENTRAL AUTHORITIES AND BETTER COOPERATION 
78 This Chapter deals with the additional mechanisms for cooperation 
and communication between Contracting States. These provisions have no 
existing counterpart under Singapore law save in the context of the 1980 
Convention. 
79 The 1996 Convention envisions Contracting States working with each 
other to fulfil the objectives of the Convention, on two broad levels: 
(a) The provision of information and facilitating communications. 
This is done mainly through the Central Authorities of each 
Contracting State. 
(b) The provision of assistance for the implementation of 
measures of protection that have been issued by one Contracting 
States. This is done mainly through the competent authorities of 
each Contracting State. 
There is no definition of “competent authority” under the 1996 Convention. 
It is clear, however, that the competent authority is that which would have 
the power to take the action required by the 1996 Convention under the law 
of the Contracting State.178 
80 Contracting States may also buttress the requirements for 
cooperation by entering into bilateral agreements with each other. Copies 
of such agreements shall then be transmitted to the depositary of the 1996 
Convention.179 
 
Case Example: Australia and Hungary180 
The role of the central authorities is illustrated by a case in Australia in 
September 2016. In that case, the applicant father made a request through the 
State Central Authority for the return of the child following allegations that the 
mother had retained the child in Australia. 
The matter came for hearing before the Australian courts. There were 
concerns raised as to the potential psychological damage which might be 
suffered by the child if he was sent back to Hungary. The hearing was 
                                                   
178 HCCH, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention, para 11.10, footnote 358. 
179 Article 39, 1996 Convention. 
180 This case example was provided by the Family Court of Australia. 
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adjourned by the Australian court for the Australian Central Authority to send 
a request for information as to what services would be available for the child 
in the event of return including the location of such services. The court 
received a letter from the relevant Hungarian body providing an extremely 
detailed response as to the institutions and persons who would be able to 
provide psychological assistance and education guidance for the child. 
A. ROLE OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
81 A Central Authority operates as a point of contact between the 
authorities of the Contracting States.181 In cases where a Contracting State 
has already designated an entity as Central Authority under the 1980 
Convention,182 there may be benefits to designating that same entity as 
Central Authority under the 1996 Convention. Both may find themselves 
being involved in the same case because parallel approaches may be 
sought under both the 1980 and 1996 Conventions simultaneously. 
82 The Central Authority of each Contracting State has two main duties 
under the 1996 Convention that cannot be delegated to other bodies. First, 
Central Authorities are under a general obligation to cooperate with each 
other and promote cooperation amongst the competent authorities in their 
states to achieve the purposes of the 1996 Convention.183 Second, Central 
Authorities are required to take appropriate steps to provide information 
on the laws of, and services available in, their States relating to the 
protection of children.184 
83 Delegable duties. There are other roles which the Central Authority 
can perform, or alternatively, can delegate to other “public authorities or 
other bodies”.185 These include: 
(a) Facilitating communications between authorities when 
references are made to an authority for assistance under Articles 8 
and 9 of the 1996 Convention.186 When facilitating such 
communications, the Central Authority may also “offer assistance” 
by transmitting any elements of information that may be helpful.187 
(b) Facilitating agreement upon solutions for the protection of the 
person or property of the child in situations where the 1996 
                                                   
181 Article 29, 1996 Convention. 
182 Singapore has designated the Ministry of Social and Family Development (“MSF”) as 
its Central Authority under the 1980 Convention. 
183 Article 30(1), 1996 Convention. 
184 Article 30(2), 1996 Convention. 
185 Articles 31 and 32, 1996 Convention. 
186 Article 31(a), 1996 Convention. 
187 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para141. 
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Convention applies. This would include modes such as mediation, 
conciliation or other similar means.188 
(c) Providing assistance to discover the whereabouts of a child in 
its State when it appears that a child may be present and in need of 
protection within its territory. This assistance is to be provided 
pursuant to the request of another Contracting State.189 
(d) Providing a report on the situation of a child that is habitually 
resident in its State and/or requesting the competent authority of its 
State to consider the need to take measures for the protection of the 
person or property of the child. This report may be provided 
pursuant to the request of the Central Authority or other competent 
authority of another Contracting State which has a substantial 
connection with the child.190 
These measures are permissive and authorise the Central Authority to 
facilitate the transfer and provision of information or reports. They do not 
impose obligations on the Central Authority to take an initiative or provide 
such information.191 On the other hand, no Central Authority shall request 
or transmit any information pursuant to the cooperation provisions within 
the 1996 Convention if its opinion is that to do so will be likely to place the 
child’s person or property in danger, or constitute a serious threat to the 
liberty or life of a member of the child’s family.192 
B. ROLE OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES 
84 The competent authorities in each Contracting State may cooperate 
with each other through two means: 
(a) communicating information or providing input in respect of 
cases where measures of protection are contemplated in relation to 
the child;193 or 
(b) assisting with the implementation of such measures of 
protection.194 
As mentioned above, the 1996 Convention permits the law of the 
Contracting State to determine the “competent authority” to take the action 
required by the Convention in these provisions.195 It is possible, though not 
                                                   
188 Article 31(b), 1996 Convention. 
189 Article 31(c), 1996 Convention. 
190 Article 32, 1996 Convention. 
191 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at paras 137 and 144. 
192 Article 37, 1996 Convention. 
193 Articles 33, 34, 35(2) and 36, 1996 Convention. 
194 Articles 35(1) and 40, 1996 Convention. 
195 HCCH, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention at para 11.10, footnote 358. 
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necessary, for a Central Authority to be appointed as the “competent 
authority” in all scenarios. 
1. Consent to trans-border placements 
85 An authority with jurisdiction under Articles 5 to 10 of the 1996 
Convention contemplating the placement of a child in another Contracting 
State may only make that decision with the consent of the Central Authority 
or other competent authority of that State.196 These placements considered 
refer to trans-border placements of the child into foster family or 
institutional care or provision of care under kafala or an analogous 
institution. Where these placements are concerned, a failure to follow the 
applicable procedure197 gives rise to a ground of non-recognition for the 
measure of protection in question.198 When the requesting authority is 
seeking the consent of the other Contracting State to the trans-border 
placement, it must transmit a report on the child and the reasons for the 
placement to the Central Authority or other competent authority of the 
requested State199. Each Contracting State must designate the authority to 
which such requests should be addressed.200 
2. Communication of information relevant to protection of the child 
86 Where a competent authority is contemplating a measure of 
protection under the 1996 Convention, it may make a request to another 
Contracting State which has information relevant to the protection of the 
child to communicate such information.201 A Contracting State may declare 
that these requests be communicated to its authorities only through its 
Central Authority.202 
3. Mutual assistance to implement measures of protection 
87 The competent authorities of a Contracting State may request the 
authorities of another Contracting State to assist in the implementation of 
measures of protection taken under the 1996 Convention.203 This mutual 
assistance may especially be sought to ensure the effective exercise of 
rights of access, as well as the right to maintain direct contacts on a regular 
basis.204 
                                                   
196 Article 33(2), 1996 Convention. 
197 Under Article 33, 1996 Convention. 
198 HCCH, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention at para 11.17. 
199 Article 33(1), 1996 Convention. 
200 HCCH, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention at para 11.15. 
201 Article 34(1), 1996 Convention. 
202 Article 34(2), 1996 Convention. 
203 Article 35(1), 1996 Convention 
204 Article 35(1), 1996 Convention. 
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4. Assisting with requests for information and findings on access 
88 In the case where the competent authority of a Contracting State is 
exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 5 to 10 of the 1996 Convention to 
determine an application concerning access to a child (the “Deciding 
Authority”): 
(a) The parent residing in a Contracting State that is not the 
habitual residence of the child can make a request to the competent 
authorities in that state to gather information or evidence and make 
a finding on the suitability of the requesting parent to exercise 
access and on the conditions under which access is to be 
exercised.205 
(b) The findings and information provided in the preceding 
paragraph shall be admitted and considered by the Deciding 
Authority before it reaches its decision on access to the child.206 
(c) The Deciding Authority is not prevented from taking 
provisional measures pending the outcome of the request made 
under Article 35(2).207 
5. Notifying a competent authority of known danger to the child 
89 Where the competent authorities of a Contracting State have taken or 
are going to take a measure of protection for a child exposed to serious 
danger, they may be informed of the child’s change or residence to, or of 
the child’s presence in, another State.208 These authorities then have the 
obligation to inform the other State of this danger and of the measure taken 
or under consideration.209 
90 While the 1996 Convention does not provide a definition for “serious 
danger”, this may include illness requiring constant treatment or drugs, 
unhealthy influence of a sect,210 where the child’s carer is under the 
supervision of the authorities due to allegations of neglect or abuse, or 
where the child is an unaccompanied minor.211 
91 Should the competent authority suspect, but not know, whether the 
child has become resident or present in another Contracting State, it may 
also utilise Article 31(c) to ascertain the whereabouts of the child. 
                                                   
205 Article 35(2), 1996 Convention 
206 Article 35(2), 1996 Convention. 
207 Article 35(4), 1996 Convention. 
208 This is irrespective of whether the child is in a contracting or non-contracting state. 
Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 150. 
209 Article 36, 1996 Convention. 
210 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 150. 
211 HCCH, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention at para 11.20. 
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6. Provision of certificate concerning parental responsibility 
92 Once a measure of protection has been taken in relation to a child, 
the authorities of the Contracting State of the child’s habitual residence, or 
of the Contracting State where the measures have been taken, may issue a 
certificate to the person who has parental responsibility or who has been 
entrusted with protection of the child’s person or property.212 This 
certificate should be issued at the person’s request. It will indicate the 
capacity in which that person is entitled to act and the powers conferred 
upon him or her.213 Some of such powers indicated in the certificate can 
include:214 
(a) A statement as to the identity of the person who holds 
parental responsibility. 
(b) Whether this parental responsibility results by operation of 
law, or from a measure of protection taken by a competent authority 
under the 1996 Convention. 
(c) The scope and extent of the powers of the person having 
parental responsibility. 
The capacity and powers set out in the certificate are given presumptive 
effect in the absence of proof to the contrary.215 
93 There is, however, no obligation for a Contracting State to provide 
such certificates.216 It is only in the event that the Contracting State decides 
to do so that it must designate authorities competent to draw up these 
certificates.217 
C. CAVEATS: RISK TO THE CHILD; DATA PRIVACY 
94 Notwithstanding anything above, an authority of a Contracting State 
is not permitted to request or transmit any information under Chapter IV of 
the 1996 Convention if to do so would, in its opinion, be likely to place the 
child’s person or property in danger, or constitute a serious threat to the 
liberty or life of a member of the child’s family. 
95 Personal data gathered or transmitted under the 1996 Convention 
shall be used only for the purposes for which they were gathered or 
                                                   
212 Article 40(1), 1996 Convention. 
213 Article 40(1), 1996 Convention. 
214 HCCH, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention at para 11.31. 
215 Article 40(2), 1996 Convention. 
216 HCCH, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention at para 11.31. 
217 Article 40(3), 1996 Convention. 
 
Report on the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children  
 
42 
transmitted.218 In this regard, the authorities to whom information is 
transmitted to, shall be responsible for ensuring its confidentiality in 
accordance with the laws of their respective States.219 
D. COST FOR CENTRAL AUTHORITIES AND COMPETENT 
AUTHORITIES 
96 Central Authorities and other public authorities of Contracting States 
shall bear their own costs in applying the provisions of Chapter IV of the 
1996 Convention.220 This includes the fixed costs of the functioning of the 
authorities, the costs of correspondence and transmissions, of seeking out 
diverse information and of localising a child, the organisation of mediation 
or settlement agreements, as well as the costs of implementation of the 
measures taken in another State, in particular placement measures.221 
97 With a view to limiting costs, many of the provisions were made 
discretionary rather than obligatory,222 and crafted with a concern not to 
make them unduly onerous. States also retain the right to impose 
reasonable charges for the provision of services.223 Any Contracting State 
may enter into agreements with one or more other Contracting States 
concerning the allocation of charges.224 Court costs and the costs of 
proceedings and lawyers are excluded from the scope of the 1996 
Convention, because “public authorities” refer to the administrative 
authorities of the Contracting States and not the courts.225 
98 The additional costs of implementation were considered in a 
National Interest Analysis conducted by the Australian Attorney-General’s 
Department prior to Australia’s accession to the Hague 1996 Convention.226 
The analysis concluded that there are “not expected to be any significant 
additional financial implications arising from the ratification of the 
Convention”. This was because there was no need to establish any new 
agencies; the role of the Central Authority under the 1996 Convention could 
be played by the already established Central Authority for the purposes of 
the 1980 Convention. Ratification was also not contemplated to result in a 
                                                   
218 Article 41, 1996 Convention. 
219 Article 42, 1996 Convention. 
220 Article 38(1), 1996 Convention. 
221 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 152. 
222 Eric Clive, “The New Hague Convention on Children” (1998) 3 Juridical Review 169 at 
p 183. 
223 Article 38, 1996 Convention. 
224 Article 38(2), 1996 Convention. 
225 Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report (15 January 1997) at para 152. 
226 Australia Attorney-General’s Department (Civil Justice Division), Convention on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, done at The Hague 
on 19 October 1996: National Interest Analysis (Document tabled on 12 March 2002) at 
paras 18–21. 
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significant increase in the number of international cases being dealt with by 
the Australian child protection authorities. The Attorney-General’s 
Department also pointed out, to the contrary, that there may be cost 
savings from the introduction of the 1996 Convention, as Australia would be 
able to reap the benefits of cooperation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION 
99 In the event a decision is made that the 1996 Convention should be 
acceded to, implementation will require further study and investigation. 
This is a matter more appropriate for a larger inter-Ministry discussion. 
This Report nonetheless raises some suggestions from the perspective of 
the legal profession, in the event that they may be of assistance. 
A. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION 
100 The 1996 Convention would require domestic legislation for 
implementation. One possibility could be to create an omnibus piece of 
legislation that would incorporate provisions of a modernised Guardianship 
of Infants Act227, the International Child Abduction Act and the 
1996 Convention, as issues such as relocation are related. This would create 
a holistic private law scheme for addressing issues relating to children. An 
example is the New Zealand Care of Children Act 2004.228 A rule-making 
power for the Family Justice Courts should be contained within the new Act 
to set out the procedure for proceedings under the new Act. 
B. APPOINTMENT OF A CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
101 A designated Central Authority is required to facilitate 
communication between Contracting States. A list of Central Authorities for 
States that have acceded to the 1996 Convention is found at Annex A. 
C. CONSULTATION AND RAISING AWARENESS OF BENCH AND BAR 
102 Training and education of the Family Bench and the Family Bar are 
important in two respects. First, the 1996 Convention is potentially wide-
ranging in its reach, and may alter established private international law 
doctrine when the proceedings in question concern another Contracting 
State. Thus it is important that both counsel and the court alike are aware 
of the applicability of the 1996 Convention, and they must be conversant in 
the rules and procedures when it does. Second, the 1996 Convention 
provides a tremendous resource that will facilitate the cooperation of 
                                                   
227 The Family Law Review Working Group recommended changes to modernise the 
Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed), to be implemented in a “Care of 
Children Act”. The incorporation of the 1996 Convention could be included in the 
same Act. 
228 Act No 90 of 2004 (NZ). 
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authorities and exchange of information between Contracting States. The 
efficacy of these provisions ultimately rests on the ability of authorities to 
utilise the tools and reach given them by the 1996 Convention. 
103 Towards this end, a thorough consultation with stakeholders, such 
as the designated Central Authority, the courts, lawyers, and other 
stakeholders, will be necessary. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
104 In conclusion, Singapore’s accession to the 1996 Convention will 
bring the following advantages and disadvantages. 
A. ADVANTAGES 
105 First, the 1996 Convention increases clarity and certainty in the 
application of jurisdictional and enforcement and recognition rules in all 
Contracting States. This does not mean that the rules in the 
1996 Convention will be applied uniformly across the globe as various 
concepts within the Convention are subject to interpretation. But it does at 
least give Contracting States a common language according to which the 
authorities, parents, and other interested persons may structure their 
affairs. 
106 Second, the 1996 Convention promotes the best interests of the 
children through its clear child centricity. The 1996 Convention focuses on 
and gives pre-eminence to the State of the child’s habitual residence, which 
ought to be the best-placed to make orders in relation to the welfare of the 
child. Yet, there is sufficient flexibility to permit the transfer of cases to 
other jurisdictions in appropriate circumstances. There is also a range of 
protective measures for urgent situations. 
107 Third, the 1996 Convention will permit automatic recognition and 
rapid enforcement of Singapore court orders in Contracting States. This will 
increase the efficacy of Singapore court orders and give them wide-reaching 
effect in other jurisdictions. 
108 Fourth, the 1996 Convention will complement and considerably 
reinforce the 1980 Convention which has been enacted into law in 
Singapore. This will make for a robust and holistic regime for the protection 
of children in cross-border cases. 
109 Fifth, the 1996 Convention provides an exemplary institutional 
framework of Central Authorities which will enable cooperation and 
communication between Contracting States. Contracting States can make 
requests for information that will greatly enhance the court or the relevant 
authority’s ability to deal with matters relating to children. 
110 Sixth, adopting the 1996 Convention at an early stage will permit 
Singapore to build up the hard and soft processes to deal with international 
issues that may arise, while the caseload is less burdensome. Singapore will 
be placed in the position of a first-mover. This is both an advantage and a 
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disadvantage: Singapore will be able to have a hand in shaping the 
jurisprudence for the 1996 Convention and forming international norms at 
an earlier stage; at the same time it will lose the benefit of learning second-
hand lessons from later adoption. 
B. DISADVANTAGES 
111 The primary disadvantage is that Singapore will have to cede 
jurisdiction to the Contracting State of the child’s habitual residence, if 
Singapore is not the habitual residence. 
112 Associated with this is the necessity that, as part of other 
Contracting States recognising and enforcing Singapore orders, Singapore 
will similarly have to recognise and enforce the orders of other Contracting 
States although the 1996 Convention has a safeguard mechanism that 
permits States to refuse recognition of foreign orders if they are manifestly 
inconsistent with the State’s public policy. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
113 The Committee’s view is that the advantages of accession to the 
1996 Convention outweigh the disadvantages. The Committee therefore 
recommends that the relevant Ministries consider accession to the 
1996 Convention. 
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ANNEX A 
1996 CONVENTION STATUS TABLE 
 
No. Country Status Central Authority 
Member States of the Hague Organisation 
1. Albania Accession Ministry of Justice 
2. Argentina Signed — 
3. Armenia Accession Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Armenia 
4. Australia Ratification Commonwealth Attorney-General’s 
Department229 
5. Austria Ratification Federal Ministry of Justice 
6. Belgium Ratification Service Publice Federale Justice 
7. Bulgaria Accession The Ministry of Justice 
8. Croatia Ratification Ministry for Demography, Family, Youth, 
and Social Policy 
9. Cyprus Ratification Ministry of Justice and Public Order 
10. Czech Republic Ratification Urad pro mezinarodne pravni ochranu 
deti 
11. Denmark Ratification The Ministry for Children and Social 
Affairs 
12. Ecuador Accession Subsecretaria de proteccion especial 
13. Estonia Accession Ministry of Justice 
14. Finland Ratification Ministry of Justice 
15. France Ratification Ministere de la Justice 
16. Georgia Accession Ministry of Justice of Georgia 
17. Germany Ratification Budesamt fur Justiz 
18. Greece Ratification Helleneic Ministry of Justice, 
Transparency and Human Rights 
19. Hungary Accession Ministry of Natural Resources 
20. Ireland Ratification Department of Justice and Equality 
21. Italy Ratification — 
22. Latvia Ratification Ministry of Justice 
23. Lithuania Accession Ministry of Social Security and Labour 
                                                   
229 Please note that the various states within Australia also each have their own Central 
Authorities. 
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No. Country Status Central Authority 
24. Luxembourg Ratification Le Procureur General d’Etat 
25. Malta Accession Director of Social Welfare Standards, 
Ministry for the Family and Social 
Solidarity 
26. Monaco Ratification Direction des Services Judiciares 
27. Montenegro Accession Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
28. Morocco Ratification Ministere de la justice et des libertes 
29. Netherlands Ratification Dutch Central Authority 
Ministry of Security and Justice 
30. Norway Ratification Royal Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security, Department of Civil Affairs 
31. Poland Ratification Ministry of Justice 
32. Portugal Ratification Direcao-Geral de Reinsercao e Servicos 
Prisionais 
33. Romania Ratification Ministry of Labour, Family, and Social 
Protection 
34. Russian Federation Accession The Ministry of Education and Science of 
the Russian Federation 
35. Serbia Accession Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran 
and Social Affairs 
36. Slovakia Ratification Ministerstvo spravodlivosti Slovenskel 
republiky 
37. Slovenia Ratification  Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities of the Republic 
of Slovenia 
38. Spain Ratification Direction Generale de Cooperation 
juridique internationale, Ministere de la 
Justice 
39. Sweden Ratification Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
40. Switzerland Ratification Office federal de la Justice 
41. Turkey Ratification  — 
42. Ukraine Accession Ministry of Justice for Ukraine 
43. United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
Ratification The International Child Abduction and 
Contact Unit, Office of the Official 
Solicitor (for England and Wales)230 
44. United States of 
America 
Signed  
45. Uruguay Accession Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura 
                                                   
230 Please note that other UK territories also each have their own Central Authorities. 
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No. Country Status Central Authority 
Non-Member States of the Hague Organisation 
46. Cuba Accession Ministry of Justice 
47. Dominican 
Republic 
Accession Consejo Nacional Para la Ninez y la 
Adolescencia 
48. Lesotho Accession Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and the 
Correctional Services 
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ANNEX B 
1980 CONVENTION STATUS TABLE 
 
No. Country Status Central Authority 
Member States of the Hague Organisation 
1. Albania Accession Ministry of Justice 
2. Andorra Accession Ministry of Social Affairs, Justice and 
Interior 
3. Argentina Ratification  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship 
4. Armenia Accession Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Armenia 
5. Australia Ratification Commonwealth Attorney-General’s 
Department231 
6. Austria Ratification Federal Ministry of Justice 
7. Belarus Accession Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Belarus 
8. Belgium Ratification Service Publice Federale Justice 
9. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Succession Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
10. Brazil Accession Brazilian Central Authority 
11. Bulgaria Accession The Ministry of Justice 
12. Burkina Faso Accession Ministere de la Femme de la Solidarite 
Nationale et de la Famille 
13. Canada Ratification Justice Legal Services232 
14. Chile Accession Corporacion de Asistencia Judicial de la 
Region Metropolitana 
15. China, People’s 
Republic of 
Continuation Secretary for Justice of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region  
(Hong Kong) 
Instituto de Accao Social  
(for Macau) 
16. Costa Rica Accession Patronato Nacional de la Infancia 
17. Croatia Succession Ministry for Demography, Family, Youth, 
and Social Policy 
                                                   
231 Please note that the various states within Australia also each have their own Central 
Authorities. 
232 Please note that the various states within Canada also each have their own Central 
Authorities. 
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No. Country Status Central Authority 
18. Cyprus Accession Ministry of Justice and Public Order 
19. Czech Republic Ratification Urad pro mezinarodne pravni ochranu 
deti 
20. Denmark Ratification The Ministry for Children and Social 
Affairs 
21. Ecuador Accession Subsecretaria de proteccion especial 
22. Estonia Accession Ministry of Justice 
23. Finland Ratification Ministry of Justice 
24. Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
Succession Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
25. France Ratification Ministere de la Justice 
26. Georgia Accession Ministry of Justice of Georgia 
27. Germany Ratification Budesamt fur Justiz 
28. Greece Ratification Helleneic Ministry of Justice, 
Transparency and Human Rights 
29. Hungary Accession Ministry of Public Administration and 
Justice 
30. Iceland Accession Ministry of the Interior 
31. Ireland Ratification Department of Justice and Equality 
32. Israel Ratification Ministry of Justice 
33. Italy Ratification Ministero della Giustizia 
34. Japan Ratification Hague Convention Bureau, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
35. Korea, Republic of Accession Ministry of Justice 
36. Latvia Accession Ministry of Justice 
37. Lithuania Accession Ministry of Social Security and Labour 
38. Luxembourg Ratification Le Procureur General d’Etat 
39. Malta Accession Director of Social Welfare Standards, 
Ministry for the Family and Social 
Solidarity 
40. Mauritius Accession The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Gender Equality, Child Development and 
Family Welfare 
41. Mexico Accession Direccion General de Proteccion a 
Mexicanos en el Exterior233 
42. Monaco Accession Direction des Services Judiciares 
                                                   
233 Please note that the various states within Mexico also each have their own Central 
Authorities. 
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No. Country Status Central Authority 
43. Montenegro Succession Ministry of Justice of Montenegro 
44. Morocco Accession Ministere de la justice et des libertes  
45. Netherlands Ratification Dutch Central Authority 
Ministry of Security and Justice 
46. New Zealand Accession Ministry of Justice 
47. Norway Ratification Royal Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security, Department of Civil Affairs 
48. Panama Accession Direccion General de Asuntos Juridicos y 
Tratados 
49. Paraguay Accession Direcction de Restitucion Internacional 
50. Peru Accession Ministero de la Mujer y Poblaciones 
vulnerables 
51. Philippines Accession Department of Justice 
Ministry of Justice 
52. Poland Accession Ministry of Justice 
53. Portugal Ratification Direcao-Geral de Reinsercao e Servicos 
Prisionais 
54. Republic of 
Moldova 
Accession Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and 
Family 
55. Romania Accession Ministry of Justice 
56. Russian Federation Accession The Ministry of Education and Science of 
the Russian Federation 
57. Serbia Succession Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Serbia 
58. Singapore Accession Singapore Central Authority 
Ministry of Social and Family 
Development 
59. Slovakia Ratification Centrum per medzinaraodnopravnu 
ochranu deti a mladeze 
60. Slovenia Accession Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities of the Republic 
of Slovenia 
61. South Africa Accession Office of the Chief Family Advocate, 
Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 
62. Spain Ratification Ministerio de Justicia 
63. Sri Lanka Accession Ministry of Justice 
64. Sweden Ratification Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
65. Switzerland Ratification Office federal de la Justice 
66. Turkey Ratification Ministry of Justice 
67. Ukraine Accession Ministry of Justice for Ukraine 
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68. United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
Ratification The International Child Abduction and 
Contact Unit, Office of the Official 
Solicitor (for England and Wales)234 
69. United States of 
America 
Ratification US Department of State – Office of 
Children’s Issues 
70. Uruguay Accession Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura 
71. Venezuela Ratification Ministerio del Poder Popular para 
Relaciones Exteriores 
72. Zambia Accession The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Community Development, Mother and 
Child Health 
Non-Member States of the Hague Organisation 
73. Bahamas Accession Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Immigration 
74. Belize Accession Ministry of Human Development and 
Social Transformation 
75. Bolivia Accession — 
76. Colombia Accession Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar 
Familiar 
77. Dominican 
Republic 
Accession Consejo Nacional Para la Ninez y la 
Adolescencia 
78. El Salvador Accession Procuradoria General de la Republica 
79. Fiji Accession The Permanent Secretary for Justice 
80. Gabon Accession — 
81. Guatemala Accession Procuradoria General de la Nacion 
82. Guinea Accession Ministere de l’Action Sociale, de la 
Promotion Feminine et de l’Enfance 
83. Honduras Accession Direccion de Ninez, Adolescencia y 
Familia 
84. Iraq Accession — 
85. Jamaica Accession — 
86. Kazakhstan Accession The Ministry of Education and Science of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan 
87. Lesotho Accession Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and the 
Correctional Services 
88. Nicaragua Accession Ministerio de la Familia Adolescencia y 
Ninez 
89. Pakistan Accession Solicitor-General, Ministry of Law and 
Justice 
                                                   
234 Please note that other UK territories also each have their own Central Authorities. 
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90. Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
Accession Ministry of the Attorney General, Justice 
and Legal Affairs 
91. San Marino Accession Tribunale Unico 
92. Seychelles Accession Director of Social Services 
Ministry of Health and Social 
Development 
93. Thailand Accession Office of the Attorney-General 
94. Trinidad & Tobago Accession International Office of Child Rights and 
Civil Child Abduction Authority 
95. Turkmenistan Accession Turkmen National Institute of Democracy 
and Human Rights under the President of 
Turkmenistan 
96. Uzbekistan Accession Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan 
97. Zimbabwe Accession Permanent Secretary for Justice and 
Legal Affairs 
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